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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to a Writ 
of Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals 
which affirmed the Third District Court's dismissal of Sandy 
City's action seeking an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
78-2-2(5) and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Whether the District Court correctly held that the 
approval by Salt Lake County of the construction of a Chevron 
service station was not urban development under Utah Code 
10-2-418. 
2. Whether the District Court correctly decided that 
Sandy City did not express a willingness to annex the Chevron 
property prior to approval by Salt Lake County of the Chevron 
conditional use permit. 
3- Whether the District Court correctly held that Salt 
Lake County complied with its zoning ordinance in the approval 
of the Chevron development. 
4. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the 
decision of the District Court. 
All issues are matters of law subject to review by this 
Court for correctness.** 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND 
ORDINANCE PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory and ordinance provisions for this 
ppeal are: 
1. Utah Code 10-2-418 (1979), which reads as follows: 
"Urban development shall not be approved or 
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality 
in the unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion 
in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such 
development under the standards and requirements 
set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that 
a property owner desiring to develop or improve 
property within the said one-half mile area may 
notify the municipality in writing of said desire 
and identify with particularity all legal and 
factual barriers preventing an annexation to the 
municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months 
from the filing with the municipality of said 
notice and after a good faith and diligent effort 
by said property owner to annex, said property 
owner may develop as otherwise permitted by law. 
Urban development beyond one-half mile of a 
municipality may be restricted or an impact 
statement required when agreed to in an interlocal 
agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal 
Cooperation Act. 
2. Utah Code 10-1-104(11) (1979), which reads as 
follows: 
"(11) 'Urban development' means a housing 
subdivision involving more than 15 residential 
units with an average of less than one acre per 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases." 
3. Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County Code of 
Ordinances 1986, which reads as follows: 
"Conditions for approval. The planning commission 
shall not authorize a conditional use permit 
unless the evidence presented is such as to 
establish: 
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A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and, 
B. That such use will not, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious 
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and, 
C. That the proposed use will comply with 
the regulations and conditions specified in this 
title for such use; and, 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. 
Sections 17-27-5, 17-27-11, and 17-27-13 of the Utah 
Code are attached as Addendum D. 
Sections 17-27-102 and 17-27-301(1)(b) and (2)(e) of 
Senate Bill 103, Planning and Zoning Revisions, 1991 General 
Session, are attached as Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. 
In November of 1987, Sandy City ("Sandy") filed a 
complaint in the Third District Court seeking an extraordinary 
writ, declaratory and injunctive relief, to void the approval 
by Salt Lake County ("County") of a conditional use permit for 
a Chevron service station on 0.7 acres of land located at 10600 
South and 1300 East in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake 
County.* 
The complaint seeks to have Chevron remove all buildings 
constructed on the property or to require it to comply with 
annexation laws and bring the property into compliance with the 
1
 R-2-34. 
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mdy City Development Code. The complaint also attacks an 
arlier decision of the County to rezone for commercial use a 
arger parcel of approximately 4.18 acres, hereinafter referred 
o as the "original parcel," which includes the Chevron parcel. 
In addition to Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County 
banning Commission, defendants include Chevron, Postero-
31ecker, Inc., Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot. Chevron is the 
ieveloper of the station at issue. Postero-Blecker acted as 
Chevron's agent in the land acquisition. Defendants Yeates, 
Priest, Kjar and Smoot were the owners of the original parcel. 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by all 
defendants in January of 1988.2 Sandy also filed its own 
motion for summary judgment3 and a motion to strike certain 
affidavits and other documents filed by Chevron.4 
On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for 
summary judgment and the motion to strike. At the hearing Salt 
Lake County filed with the Court the certified record of the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake County 
Commission proceedings regarding the Chevron application and 
the zoning for the original parcel.5 Sandy objected to the 
2
 R-75, 125, 155. 
3
 R-151. 
4
 R-173. 
J
 The certified administrative record is contained in 
Envelopes 1 through 6. Each envelope includes a numbered index 
of the documents within the envelope. The Chevron record is in 
Envelopes 3 and 4; the McDonald's record is in Envelopes 1 and 
2; and the zoning of the original parcel is in Envelopes 5 and 
6. 
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certification of the record. The Motion to Strike was denied 
by the Court. All other motions were taken under advisement by 
the Court.6 
At a subsequent hearing held on February 9, 1988, the 
District Court allowed Sandy to include in the administrative 
record all of the County files on McDonald's restaurant 
development which, by the time of the hearing, had been 
approved by the County on a parcel adjacent to the Chevron 
parcel.7 
On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision 
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying 
Sandy's motion for summary judgment.8 On April 8, 1988, the 
Court entered its Order of Judgment and Dismissal.9 
On June 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the District Court.10 Sandy's petition for 
rehearing before the Court of Appeals was denied. 
All defendants except Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission were dismissed from the suit in 
October of 1990 pursuant to a settlement agreement with Sandy. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
1. In April of 1987, Chevron's predecessors in 
interest, Priest, Yeates, Kjar and Smoot (sellers), applied to 
R-219. 
R-252. 
R-259, Addendum A. 
R-2 65, Addendum B. 
Addendum C. 
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It Lake County to have approximately 4.18 acres of property 
cated on the northwest corner of the intersection of 1300 
ist and 10600 South in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake 
)unty zoned from Residential R-l-8 (8,000 square foot single 
amily lots) to Residential RM-ZC (office) and Commercial 
- 2 1 1 . The ZC designation attached certain conditions limiting 
he height of buildings and the nature of uses that could be 
leveloped on the original property. * 
2. The original property is located within the Little 
Cottonwood Master Plan Area which is part of the Salt Lake 
County Master Plan. The master plan, which was published in 
1976, consists of 91 pages of text and includes a map of the 
area covered by the plan.13 
3. After hearing the matter, the Planning Commission 
recommended to the Board of County Commissioners that the 
zoning be approved. The County staff asked Sandy for a 
recommendation to which Sandy replied.14 No Sandy 
representative attended the hearing.15 
4. On August 5, 1987, the Board of County 
Commissioners heard the matter.16 Notice of the hearing was 
1 1
 R-209. 
1 2
 R-179. 
1 3
 Envelope 3, Document 11. 
1 4
 R-248, Envelope 6, Document 2. 
1 5
 R-109. 
1 6
 Envelope 5, Document 6. 
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published and posted as required by law.17 Again, nc 
representative of Sandy attended the hearing.18 At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Board of County Commissioners 
approved the zoning change.19 
5. On September 18, 1987, Sandy filed a petition 
asking the Board of County Commissioners to reconsider its 
decision to zone the original parcel RM-ZC and C-2.20 The 
petition asked that the property be zoned back for single 
family dwellings. The request was based in part on the fact 
that any new commercial development in the county would compete 
with Sandy*s shopping center immediately to the east.21 Sandy 
also objected because its master plan only allowed commercial 
development on one corner of an intersection and it had already 
approved commercial development on the adjacent corner which 
happened to be in Sandy City.22 On September 18, 1987, the 
Board of County Commissioners denied Sandy's petition to 
reconsider the zoning.2^ 
Envelope 5, Documents 2 and 3. 
R-109. 
R-102. 
R-25. 
R-25-26. 
R-26. 
Envelope 5, Document 9. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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6. On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, as agent for 
evron, applied for a conditional use permit to build the 
evron station on 0.7 acres of the original parcel.24 
7. The County Planning Commission heard the matter on 
iptember 22, 1987, at which time evidence was presented 
)ncerning the application.25 The matter was continued by the 
Dunty Planning Commission until October 13, 1987, at which 
ime the application was approved after additional evidence was 
resented.26 
8. Evidence presented at the County Planning Commission 
learings included the following: 
A. Strong support for the application by residents 
)f the area.27 
B.. Testimony by representatives of Chevron of a 
need for the service in the area.28 
C. Recommendations for preliminary approval by the 
County planning staff subject to certain conditions.29 
2 4
 R-20. 
2 5
 R-107-111. 
2 6
 R-112-115. 
2 7
 R-110, 111. 
2 8
 R-113. 
2 9
 R-108. 
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D. Testimony in support of the application fror 
the White City Community Council and from the Unitec 
Association of Community Councils.30 
E. Testimony from Chevron officials estimating the 
cost of the project as $175,000.31 
F. Favorable recommendations from the County Board 
of Health, the Fire Department, the Flood Control Division, the 
Planning staff, and other agencies.32 
G. An appraisal filed by Sandy estimating that the 
"market value" of the Chevron development was between $660,000 
and $760,000, including the land, site and building 
improvements, tenant finish, fixtures and equipment. Of that 
amount, land was valued at $210,000.00.33 
9. The Planning Commission made specific findings of 
fact concerning the issues involved in the application. The 
Planning Commission specifically found that the application was 
consistent with the Little Cottonwood District Development Plan 
and would provide a needed service for the area.34 
3 0
 R-110. 
3 1
 R-108. 
3 2
 Envelope 3, Document 2. 
3 3
 R-133, Envelope 3. 
3 4
 R-116, Addendum F. 
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10. On October 21, 1987, the Board of County 
mmissioners upheld the County Planning Commission decision by 
nying the appeal of Sandy City.35 
11. On September 30, 1987, McDonald's Corporation filed 
i application for a McDonald's restaurant on a parcel of land 
.thin the original property adjacent to the Chevron parcel.36 
I October 27, 1987, the County Planning Commission approved 
le application,37 On December 9, 1987, the Board of County 
^mmissioners upheld the decision of the Planning Commission.38 
12. The Chevron conditional use application was 
rocessed separately from any other development and meets all 
ounty requirements independently from any other existing or 
otential development within the original property. y 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues in this case have been reviewed by the County 
banning Commission, the Board of County Commissioners, the 
)istrict Court, and the Court of Appeals. At every level the 
approval of the Chevron station has been upheld. Judicial 
review of a zoning decision is limited to a determination of 
whether there is a reasonable basis for the decision. The 
Envelope 3, Document 4. 
R-168. 
R-167. 
R-242. 
R-180, Envelope 3. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
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judicial review is based on the administrative record and i! 
not de novo. 
In this case, the record supports the approval of th« 
Chevron station by the County Planning Commission. By its 
prior approval of a major mall immediately across 1300 East, 
Sandy changed the character of the area and therefore it was 
well within the discretion of the Planning Commission tc 
interpret the intent of the County Master Plan on the basis of 
the present development pattern in the area. 
The District Court correctly held that the Chevron 
service station is not urban development under Utah Code 
10-2-418. Only when the projected costs of a commercial 
development exceed $750,000 for any or all phases is the County 
statutorily limited in its ability to approve the development. 
Cost projections for the Chevron development should not include 
the costs of the McDonald's development and other potential 
developments on adjacent parcels which have no relationship to 
Chevron other than the fact they were divided from the same 
original parcel as the Chevron parcel. Projected costs for 
purposes of §418 should not include land, tenant finish, 
equipment, and personal property. 
If land cost alone is excluded from the evidence of cost 
projections for the Chevron development submitted by Sandy, the 
cost projections fall far under the $750,000 figure. 
The District Court also correctly held that Sandy failed 
to express a willingness to annex the property as required by 
-11-
L8. The statute requires a willingness to annex the 
addition to the enactment of a policy declaration 
e area. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT IS NOT URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT UNDER UTAH CODE 10-2-418. 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
Sandy argues that cities, not counties, should provide 
micipal-type services and therefore "cost projections" for a 
svelopment should include all expenses that in any way relate 
) the development project. This position ignores many 
covisions of the annexation statute and other statutes 
3verning powers of cities and counties. The County's enabling 
*gislation for planning and zoning40 specifically provides 
hat counties may plan and provide for business and industrial 
evelopment. One of the purposes of a county master plan is to 
rovide uses of land for "urbanization," "trade" and 
industry."41 The Act provides that counties adopt a zoning 
Ian for the unincorporated county which includes uses for 
trade" and "industry,"42 The purpose of zoning regulations 
4 0
 Utah Code 17-21-1 through 27. 
4 1
 Utah Code 17-27-5. 
4 2
 Utah Code 17-27-11. 
property 
covering 
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for the county include "the protection of both urban anc 
nonurban development."43 
The enabling act for planning and zoning in counties 
preceded the enactment of Utah Code 10-2-418 in 1979; however, 
the 1991 Legislature recodified this enabling legislation.44 
The new legislation actually strengthens the authority of 
counties to provide for business and industrial development and 
the protection of urban development. J 
Cities and counties also have been granted by the 
legislature almost identical powers with regard to providing 
municipal-type services.46 The legislature has specifically 
dealt with the "double taxation" issue since the enactment of 
Chapter 2 of Title 10 in 1979.47 
4 3
 Utah Code 17-27-13. 
4 4
 Senate Bill 103. The effective date of Senate Bill 
103 is July 1, 1992. 
4 5
 Senate Bill 103. 17-27-102, 17-27-301(1)(b) and 
(2)(e); Attachment E to this brief. 
4 6
 Utah Code 17-5-1 through 17-5-88, Powers and 
Authorities of Counties; Utah Code 17-34-1 through 17-34-5, 
Municipal Services to Unincorporated Areas; Utah Code 10-8-1 
through 10-8-89, Powers and Authorities of Cities; Mountain 
States Telephone v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Ut. 1985) 
cited by Sandy has no relevancy to the authority of counties to 
provide services. The holding was limited to a determination 
that counties have no authority to provide a business license 
tax. 
47 
and 1985 
provided 
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Amendments to Utah Code 17-34-2 and 17-34-4 in 1982 
require separate budgets for municipal-type services 
to unincorporated areas. 
Legislative policy makes it clear that the legislature 
bended a balanced approach to annexation, contrary to Sandy's 
sition that the legislature intended urban development should 
construed as broadly as possible to force all commercial and 
dustrial development into cities.48 If the legislature 
nted to prevent counties from approving any industrial or 
mmercial development adjacent to cities, it could have 
ecifically prohibited counties from doing so. Sandy's 
ncern about nonconforming uses cannot be taken seriously 
nee annexation of the Chevron parcel is contingent upon Sandy 
:panding the commercial area approved by the County.49 
The point is that legislative intent with regard to the 
waning of urban development should not be interpreted on the 
isis of any one statement of policy since Utah law expresses a 
imber of different policies and requirements that govern 
inexation and development. Rather, the legislative intent 
ith regard to how costs should be determined should be based 
i the purpose of §418 and the practical considerations in the 
^plication of the law. 
q
° 10-2-401(6). "Decisions with respect to municipal 
Dundaries and urban development need to be made with adequate 
Dnsideration of the effect of proposed actions on adjacent 
reas and the interests of all other governmental entities, on 
he need for and the cost of local government services and the 
bility to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and 
n factors related to population growth and density and the 
eography of the area." 
49
 See the Suggestion of Mootness filed by County. 
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B. THE PROJECTED COSTS OF A DEVELOPMENT SHOULD Bl 
DETERMINED INDEPENDENTLY OF COSTS FOR OTHER ADJACEN' 
DEVELOPMENTS. 
(1) THE ZONING PROCESS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME T< 
DETERMINE THE COSTS FOR A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT. 
Sandy now contends that the zoning process is not th< 
appropriate time to raise issues concerning the costs oi 
development because it was impossible to estimate such costs a\ 
the time of zoning.50 The County agrees. 
In this case, the zoning of the original property, th* 
approval of the Chevron development and the subsequent approval 
of the McDonald's development all occurred within the same year 
and therefore some knowledge was available during the zoninc 
process as to what developments might ultimately occur on the 
original property. However, often the zoning of land and the 
subsequent sale and development of various parcels may be years 
apart. In such cases it would be pure speculation for a county 
or a city to estimate the costs of any development other than 
at the time the specific development is being considered for 
approval. 
In this case, using Sandy's theory of combining the 
potential developments on the original property together and 
It is ironic Sandy now takes this position since in 
the Court of Appeals Sandy attempted to tie the Chevron 
development to the McDonald's development by contending that 
"The property owner's entire development was laid out and 
presented to the County at the time that the commercial zoning 
was requested." Sandy Reply Brief in the Court of Appeals, p. 
12. 
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eluding land, fixtures, equipment, personal property, etc. as 
Dsts," Sandy could have filed suit at the time the property 
3 rezoned. However, requiring that projected costs of a 
velopment be determined at the time of zoning would establish 
unworkable rule of law.51 On the same basis, requiring that 
e projected costs for all future developments on different 
reels divided from the same original parcel be determined at 
e time of development of the first parcel would also 
tablish an unworkable rule of law. 
Even in cases where the plans for an adjacent commercial 
velopment are known at the time of the first commercial 
velopment, there is no assurance that the later proposed 
velopment will be approved. 2 
(2) THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT IS SEPARATE FROM THE 
MCDONALD#s DEVELOPMENT. 
The record is clear that the Chevron development was 
>proved separately from the later-approved McDonald's 
ivelopment and from any future potential development of the 
:her parcel of land within the original property. No 
negation is made by Sandy that the Chevron development by 
D 1
 The Court of Appeals decision should be upheld but not 
i the basis assigned in Point II of the Court's opinion where 
ie Court of Appeals held that challenges to cost projections 
ider §418 should be made at the time of rezoning of the 
coperty. The County urges adoption of the holding of the 
istrict Court that §418 is not applicable to this case. 
Many commercial uses under the County zoning ordinance 
re conditional uses which the Planning Commission may deny. 
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itself fails to meet any County zoning ordinance requiremen 
such as acreage, parking or yard spaces. Yet Sandy contend: 
that the Chevron development must be lumped together with tin 
McDonald's and other potential developments located within th< 
original parcel as multiple phases of one development.53 Th< 
County submits Sandy misconstrues the applicable statutor] 
provisions. Utah Code 10-2-418 as pertinent reads as follows: 
Urban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half 
mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration. If 
a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development 
under the standards and requirements set 
forth in this chapter;.... 
The term "urban development" is defined in Utah Code 
10-1-104(11) which states: 
"Urban development" means a 
housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an average of 
less than one acre per residential unit, 
or a commercial or industrial develop-
ment for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases. 
A phased development is where one developer obtains 
approval and builds an integrated development over time. The 
management, parking, amenities and design of the different 
phases are interrelated. In such a case, the County would have 
53 Sandy emphasizes the fact that the fee title in the 
parcels had not been transferred to Chevron and McDonald's at 
the time of the applications. However, the record establishes 
that McDonald's and Chevron purchased the respective parcels. 
R-180; McDonald's Record R-101, 105-115. 
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2 ability to estimate the costs of future phases of an entire 
/elopment at the time it reviews the plans for the first 
ase. That is not the situation when the adjacent 
yelopments are related only by the fact that they have been 
rved out of the same original parcel. The County has no way 
computing the estimated costs of potential nearby commercial 
velopments as part of the process of estimating the cost of 
e first development. 
Sandy contends the Chevron development is part of a 
mmercial division of the original parcel. However, the 
gislature has specifically excluded commercial subdivisions 
om the definition of subdivisions in the enabling legislation 
ich permits counties to regulate subdivision approval. * 
ndy makes no contention herein that the development required 
bdivision approval. 
Also persuasive is the fact that the legislature, in 
ifining urban development in Section 10-1-104(11), used the 
irm "subdivision" only in defining urban development for 
irposes of residential development. The term "subdivision" is 
>t included in a definition of commercial or industrial 
54 ..."Subdivision" means the division of a tract or lot 
: parcel of land into three or more lots, plats, sites or 
:her divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or 
lture of sale or building development; provided that this 
^finition shall not include a bona fide division or partition 
E agricultural land for agricultural purposes or of 
pmmercial, manufacturing or industrial land for commercial, 
anufacturing or industrial purposes.... Utah Code 17-27-27. 
Emphasis added.) 
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development and therefore a "commercial subdivision" should no 
be considered a phased development under §418. 
C. THE PURPOSE AND PRACTICAL OPERATION OF SECTION 41 
REQUIRE THAT LAND COSTS, TENANT FINISH, EQUIPMENT AN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY NOT BE INCLUDED AS PROJECTED COSTS. 
(1) LAND COSTS. 
In determining legislative intent with regard to th 
type of costs that should be included in calculating whethe 
the costs of an industrial or commercial development wil 
exceed $750,000, the purpose of the statute should b 
considered.55 The purpose of §418 is to limit the authority o 
counties to approve large industrial or commercial development! 
that could affect the planning for an area which a city ma: 
want to annex in the future. It is the development of th< 
land, not the land itself, that affects planning decisions anc 
impacts an area. The ordinary understanding of the terr 
"development" relates to construction which changes th« 
character of the land.56 To "develop" a parcel of ground means 
to "build" upon the ground.57 
In addition, the wording of Utah Code 10-1-104(1) does 
support the position that land value at the time a proposec 
Parson Asphalt Products. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm., 
617 P.2d 397 (Ut. 1980); Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Ut. 1980). 
5 6
 City of Louisville v. District Court. Cty. of Boulder, 
543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975). 
5 7
 Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Ut. App. 
1988) . 
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'elopment is being reviewed by a county should be included in 
:ermining "cost projections" for a development. Since the 
itute uses the term "cost," and not "value," the dollar 
>unt applicable to the land would vary greatly depending on 
in the current developer purchased the land. If the land had 
sn owned by the developer for a long period of time, the cost 
*ely would be much less than the cost of the same piece of 
id purchased recently. Often the developer leases the land 
3 there is no actual purchase cost or the proposed 
velopment may involve an expansion of an existing development 
t involving any additional land. 
Thus, if land cost is included for determining cost 
ojections, the result would be arbitrary, depending on the 
te and the nature of the land transaction and the nature of 
e development. 
If the cost of the land is over $750,000, nothing could 
done with the land without annexing to a city. On the other 
nd, if the cost of land is minimal because it has been owned 
r a long period of time or has been inherited or leased, a 
ivelopment costing in excess of $700,000 can be placed on the 
ircel without triggering the annexation requirement, 
igislation should not be given an interpretation that leads to 
)surd results. ^ 
58 Durfey v. Bd. of Education of Wayne County School 
LSt. , 604 P.2d 480 (Ut. 1979). 
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Presumably, if the legislature had intended land valu< 
to be part of the cost of development, it would have used th( 
term "value" and not "cost." Also, the legislature used th< 
term "cost projections," which implies a future cost and noi 
one that may already had been incurred years before the time ol 
the proposed development. 
Excluding the value of land from Sandy's own appraisal 
for the Chevron development, the projection cost of the 
development would be between $450,000 and $550,000. 
(2) TENANT FINISH, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Another rule of statutory interpretation that is helpful 
in this case is that in determining legislative intent, the 
practical operation of the statute should be considered.59 The 
time at which a county has to make a decision as to whether a 
proposed office or commercial development is "urban 
development" is when the developer applies for a permit to 
develop. In addition, the permitting process is the time when 
the county has the opportunity to determine the projected cost 
of a development by reviewing the plans for a development. 
In many cases it would be pure speculation for the 
county to determine what kind of internal tenant finish, 
equipment and personal property will end up in an office or 
commercial development. For instance, when the county reviews 
D
* State v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Education, 13 U.2d 56, 
368 P.2d 468 (Ut. 1962). 
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application for an office building, the owner may not have 
ased the offices. How the offices will be furnished and 
lipped is later decided by each tenant after the building has 
sn approved and constructed and the offices leased, 
A more specific example would be a small office building 
r doctors or dentists. Depending on the kind of doctor or 
ntist who leases the office space, the cost of the equipment 
uld vary substantially. The situation may well be the same 
th a small commercial development. 
Also, as in the case of raw land, tenant finish, 
uipment and personal property have no impact on land use for 
L area that a city may want to annex in the future. 
To permit counties to apply §418 in a consistent and 
janingful manner in determining whether there is authority to 
;sue a permit for a proposed development, speculative costs 
ich as tenant finish, equipment and personal property should 
)t be included. The county may be able to estimate such costs 
i some cases but in many others this would not be possible, 
le kinds of costs that must be projected for purposes of §418 
tiould not vary from case to case or there will always be 
Dtential litigation between cities and counties concerning 
hether a certain kind of cost is projectable at the time the 
ounty reviews a project. 
In order to have a consistent and meaningful standard, 
he projected costs of a development for purposes of §418 
hould be the development costs for the construction of 
-22-
buildings and site improvements. They are the costs the 
result in improvements which have an impact on an area ar 
which are reasonably determinable by a county during the permi 
process. 
POINT II 
SANDY DID NOT EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS TO 
ANNEX. 
Section 10-2-418 restricts "urban development" withi 
one-half mile of a municipality where the property involved i 
"in the unincorporated territory which the municipality ha 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, i 
the municipality is willing to annex the territory...." Sand; 
argues that the inclusion of the Chevron parcel within the are; 
of its master policy declaration adopted in 1979 and lasl 
amended in 1983 meets this requirement. The District Court 
correctly held otherwise. 
Sandy's argument would make surplusage of the 
willingness-to-annex standard under §418. General rules of 
statutory construction require all language in a statute should 
be given effect.60 If a policy declaration, which must include 
a "map or legal description of the unincorporated territory 
into which the municipality anticipates or favors expansion of 
its boundaries,"61 in itself sufficed, a separate statutory 
DU
 Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 U.2d 100, 485 P.2d 
1035 (1971). 
6 1
 Utah Code 10-2-414(1). 
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uirement of willingness to annex would be unnecessary. The 
ter policy declaration enacted by Sandy City is not directed 
any particular annexation. The annexation of a particular 
eel may occur years after enactment of the master policy 
laration and may involve an entirely different city 
ncil.62 Accordingly, §418 requires an independent 
• ression of a willingness to annex by a city council at the 
le the property is being considered for development. 
The only binding form that the required willingness to 
lex could take is a resolution enacted by the city council in 
:ice at the time the property is being considered for 
relopment. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE DECISION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT UPHOLDING THE COUNTY'S 
APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON CONDITIONAL USE 
PERMIT. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS LIMITED TO A DETERMINA-
TION BY THE COURT THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
DEMONSTRATING A REASONABLE BASIS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
DECISION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVING THE CHEVRON 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions 
at the court will not interfere with zoning decisions of 
cal jurisdictions unless there is no reasonable basis 
A city council enacting a master policy declaration 
•uld not bind future city councils with regard to a particular 
mexation. 
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whatsoever to justify the decision and therefore the actio 
must be regarded as arbitrary and capricious.63 
This same standard has been applied to judicial revie 
of the approval of a conditional use permit.64 
Judicial review of a decision by a local governmen 
board, through an action seeking an extraordinary writ, i 
limited to a determination of whether the local board exceedei 
its jurisdiction or abused its descretion in rendering it: 
decision.65 Such a review is on the record and the complaining 
party is not entitled to a de novo trial.66 
Sandy claims the "arbitrary and capricious" standarc 
should not apply because in Sandy's opinion the approval of the 
development violated county ordinances and therefore the 
Planning Commisson exceeded its authority. This position begs 
the question. The issue is whether the Chevron development 
violated the county ordinances. The interpretation of zoning 
plans and ordinances is the responsibility of local zoning 
agencies and employees having the authority to enact and 
6 3
 Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704 (Ut. 1943); 
Naylor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 410 P.2d 764 (Ut. 1966); Dowse 
v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1953); Gavland v. 
Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633 (Ut. 1961). 
6 4
 Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Ut. 1979). 
6 5
 Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6 6
 Peatross v. Board of County Comm'rs., 555 P.2d 281 
(Ut. 1976). 
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inister such plans6' and courts defer to the interpretation 
the local agency unless the decision is arbitrary and 
ricious.68 
APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON STATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE. 
The Planning Commission made specific findings that the 
svron application met all of the required criteria for 
proval of a conditional use under the county zoning 
linance.69 The record supports these findings- There is 
stimony in the record from Chevron representatives as to the 
rket need for a service station in the area and from 
sidents in the area supporting the desirability for a service 
ation. There are favorable recommendations from the County 
re Department, Health Department, Flood Control Division and 
her agencies. The County Traffic Engineer approved the site 
an. There is also a favorable recommendation from the County 
velopment Services Division setting conditions which 
>propriately buffer the station from the residential 
jvelopment in the area. This evidence supports the finding of 
le Planning Commission that the development will provide a 
b/
 The Planning Commission and Board of County 
Dmmissioners are responsible for enactment and amendment of 
Dunty master plans and zoning ordinances. Utah Code §§17-27-4 
tirough 17-27-65; 17-27-11; 17-27-14. 
68
 Cascade Broadcasting Corp. v. Groener, 626 P.2d 386 
Dr. App. 1981); Robert L. Rieke Bldq. Co., Inc. v. City of 
verland Park, 657 P.2d 1121 (Kansas 1983). 
69
 R-116-117. 
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service to the community and will not be detrimental to tl 
area. 
The Planning Commission finding that the development i 
consistent with the intent of the Little Cottonwood Distric 
Master Plan is supported by a number of provisions in the pic 
itself.70 The Little Cottonwood District Master Plan contair 
both a short term and a long term element- The plan wa 
approved in 1976 with a primary emphasis on development throug 
1985. MP2. It is not intended as a firm guide for ever 
development and more intensive uses may be appropriate in th 
long term. MP3-5. The plan provides that commercia 
development should take place at intersections (MP41) an 
adjacent to existing development. MP10. The propose^ 
development is consistent with all of those standards in tin 
plan. 
Since 1976, a great amount of growth has taken place ii 
the southern part of the county including a major commercia] 
development approved by Sandy across the street from the 
Chevron and McDonald's developments.71 This growth, ir 
addition to Sandy's approval of commercial development across 
the street, constituted a de facto amendment of the master plan 
which should be interpreted on the basis of today's factual 
/u
 The Little Cottonwood District Development Plan is 
contained in the record in Envelope 3, number 11. Citations to 
the master plan will be designated in this brief as MP and the 
appropriate page number. 
71 R-242, 243, comments of County Planning Director. 
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nation.72 This Court has specifically held that local 
ing bodies can take into consideration changed circumstances 
ce the adoption of a master plan in reviewing a proposed 
elopment.73 
No serious argument can be made that the Chevron parcel 
Id have been developed in any manner other than commercial. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE. 
Sandy argues that it should have been allowed to take 
positions and conduct extensive discovery in this case in 
ler to develop evidence. Since judicial review in this 
:ter is based upon the record and is not a de novo 
>ceeding, Sandy has no right to conduct such discovery. More 
?ortantly, Sandy's contention that there are factual issues 
dispute is based solely upon Sandy's own version of the law 
Lch the District Court correctly rejected. If land costs and 
sts of other proposed developments within the original parcel 
e excluded from cost projections, then the evidence submitted 
om both Sandy and Chevron showed the Chevron development to 
less than $750,000. 
When the District Court resolved the legal issues in 
is case, there remained no relevant factual disputes. The 
72 Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Town of Bedford 
Mt. Kesco, 33 N.Y.S.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155 (1973); Bone v. 
ty of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046 (Id. 1984). 
7 3
 Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra. 
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County submits that the District Court correctly resolved tl 
legal issues and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Salt Lake Count 
submits the decisions of the District Court and Court o 
Appeals should be upheld. 
DATED this 21st day of May, 1991. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By_ /*£~^f J N£U*^ 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees 
[R1227] 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS'T^CT* 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304 
Plaintiff's and defendants1 Motions for Summary Judc 
came before this Court on the 5th day of February, 1988. 
parties were represented by respective counsel. After argum 
the Court took the matter under advisement. On the 25th da 
February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motion for Certificatioi 
Record came before this Court. The matter was taken u 
advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record. A 
reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the C< 
finds as follows. 
1. Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in rezoi 
the property in question, and was not in violation of any coi 
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily 
capriciously. Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived 
right to object to rezoning. 
kNDY CITY V. COUNTY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake 
ounty Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for 
evelopment of the subject property. The project, based on the 
acts, is necessary and desirable, and not detrimental to the 
general welfare. Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated 
icted properly in processing its application through the only 
)ody with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County. Sandy City 
lid not have jurisdiction to accept the application. 
3. Defendants1 actions do not violate Utah Code Ann., 
Section 10-2-418. 
(a) Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban 
development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area. 
(b) Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex 
the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation. 
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated 
that it would annex the subject property. Even if Chevron 
petitioned for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no 
assurance Sandy City would approve Chevronfs application. 
Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for 
annexation. 
(c) The value of the fixtures and personal property 
should not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000.00. Furthermore, the 
application of Chevron should be considered a single development. 
V. s./ W .-.* ~ +J 
SANDY CITY V. COUNTY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECI! 
(d) Even if Chevron's application were not considi 
a single development, and were combined with McDonald's proj< 
the project will still not exceed $750,000,00. 
(e) At this time Chevron has taken all the necesj 
procedures for approval of their application, and is ready 
proceed with their project. 
4. Based on the facts before the Court, it appears 1 
Salt Lake County Commission has conducted a hearing 1 
comported with all due process requirements. It appears to 1 
acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearii 
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted 
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside rea 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitra 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 I 
231 (1976). 
5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Sa 
City's Motion to Strike should be denied, and Sandy City's Mot 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. Furthermore, all of 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake Count 
Motion for Certification should be granted. Counsel 
defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order for the Court's 
oc 
ionature. Said Order should be approved as to for. »V .11 
arties. 
/^TZ3'
 day of March, 1988. Dated this. 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-••V i < - k . I 
H.|DiXC;-iH:?i::-,_£Y 
By <kz*^M^ASUl^.^. 
*^, «J:'f"«i. > C : t I 
00^2.6*-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct coi 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to 
following, this \ —> day of March, 1988: 
Walter R. Miller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
8TATE OF UTAH ) S8 
Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney K 
Attorney for Salt Lake County Defendants* 
2001 S. State, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Leonard J. Lewis 
John W. Andrews 
Attorneys for Defendant Chevron 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Attorney for Defendants Yeates, Priest, 
Kjar and Smoot 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
I, THE UND€*8»GNfiO. CLERK OF 
COURT OF SA^T LAKE COUNTY UTA 
CERTIFY THAT THE AMNEXEO AND F 
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN OR 
MENT ON RLE IfiWY OFFICE 
WITNESS m trW^^HW 
THIS J J — jD*Y dF & U / 
h DIXON HM^EYj CL&W 
K\mm 
0C!J 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947 
John W. Andrews, #4724 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah* SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants. 
The following matters came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th 
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County uiah 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-7304 
Honorable Raymond Uno 
Dn For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
Dn To Strike. Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews 
ared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kent S. 
s appeared on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and 
Lake County Planning Commission; Brinton R. Burbidge 
ared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
es; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff 
ly City. 
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda 
arguments of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is 
>by ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary 
gment and Motion To Strike are denied; 
(2) It appearing that no material issues of fact 
st, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby 
nted. It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of 
dy City in this action and all causes of action contained 
rein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed 
:h prejudice, 
.w 
DATED this ;£ day of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
* . DIXON HiNpLSY ^ ^ ^ ^ w ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ f t - ^ 
f'>'• ''•"l.Af.liy"iii/JJ^ Raymond S. Uno 
l - T " ' " " t uep^TS" District Judge 
2
" 0 G C 2 6 6 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAN OOTT, BAGLETPT CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq. 
John W. Andrews, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Walter R. Miller, Esq. 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent S. Lewis, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Defendants 
2001 South State Street 
#53600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
^K . .'" <*< 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeate; 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5747A 
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present sufficient evidence to sustain the 
convictions. However, in light of the de-
tailed findings of fact of the trial judge, all 
of which find support in the record, we find 
this claim to be without merit. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdi-
vision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission; K. De-
lyn Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. Scott 
Kjar, Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Bleck-
er, Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 880429-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 7, 1990. 
Municipal corporation brought action 
against county, developers and property 
owners challenging issuance of conditional 
use permit to allow service station to be 
built on rezoned property. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. 
Uno, J., dismissed city's action, and city 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., 
held that allowing administrative record to 
be submitted at hearing for motion for 
summary judgment rather than beforehand 
was not abuse of discretion; (2) affidavits 
produced in support of motion for summa-
ry judgment had adequate evidentiary 
foundations; (3) city was not entitled to 
motion for continuance to obtain further 
discovery; and (4) as result of failure to 
object to urban development at time of 
zoning determination, city was precluded 
:rom raising issue on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, J., concurred in result. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1), 1024.4 
In reviewing summary judgment, ap-
pellate court considers evidence in light 
most favorable to losing party and affirms 
only if it appears that no genuine dispute 
exists as to any material issues of fact or, 
if moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law, even according to facts as 
contended by losing party. 
2. Zoning and Planning <s=»618 
Courts of law cannot substitute judg-
ment in area of zoning regulations for that 
of municipality's governing body. 
3. Zoning and Planning <©»601, 614 
Courts will not consider wisdom, neces-
sity, or advisability or otherwise interfere 
with municipality's zoning determination 
unless it is shown that no reasonable basis 
to justify action taken exists. 
4. Zoning and Planning <s=>642 
If administrative record of zoning pro-
cedure has been preserved, matter will be 
reviewed on record and de novo trial is 
inappropriate. U.C.A.1953, 10-9-15. 
5. Zoning and Planning <s=>625 
Any error in admitting administrative 
record of zoning procedure during hearing 
on motion for summary judgment, rather 
than before, was harmless because record 
was essentially cumulative with respect to 
evidence already before court. 
6. Zoning and Planning <s»643 
Admitting administrative record of 
zoning procedure at time of trial was with-
in discretion of trial court, absent showing 
that party lacked actual notice and time to 
prepare to meet questions raised by admit-
ted documents. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 6(d). 
7. Judgment <3»185.1(8) 
Affidavit which does not meet require-
ments for admission as evidence is subject 
to motion to strike since inadmissible evi-
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dence cannot be considered in ruling on 
motion for summary judgment Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rules 6(d), 56, 56(e). 
8. Judgment e=»l85.3(1) 
Affidavits presented by county in sup-
port of granting conditional use permit 
were admissible as portions of administra-
tive record before county planning commis-
sion and were not subject to motion to 
strike. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e, f); 
Rules of Evid., Rules 902(4), 1005. 
9. Judgment e=»186 
Motions under rule allowing court to 
continue summary judgment motions to 
permit moving party to obtain further dis-
covery should be granted liberally to pro-
vide adequate opportunity for any genuine 
^ issues of fact to be discovered; further 
discovery, however, will not be allowed if 
parties did not diligently pursue discovery. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(f). 
10. Judgment <s=>186 
In order to be entitled to continuance 
of summary judgment motion to complete 
discovery, movant must file affidavit to 
preserve contention that judgment should 
be delayed pending further discover}*, 
which affidavit must explain how request-
ed continuance would aid opposition to 
summarv judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
56(f). 
11. Judgment <s=186 
Evidence presented in affidavit in sup-
port of motion to continue summary judg-
ment motion to allow further discovery in-
dicated further discovery would produce 
only cumulative evidence and that movant 
lacked due diligence, and, thus, movant 
was not entitled to continuance. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(f). 
12. Zoning and Planning <s=»644 
Evidence in zoning record supported 
findings that projected cost of development 
project and proposed development were in 
compliance with county master plan and 
county ordinances. 
13. Zoning and Planning <3=>572 
Even though city in master policy dec-
laration had indicated interest in annexing 
property if property owners petitioned, 
property owners never petitioned nor did 
city attempt to annex property on its own, 
and, thus, city was precluded from raising 
annexation issue. U.C.A.1953, 10-2-414, 
10-2-418, 10-9-9. 
14. Zoning and Planning $=>572 
Municipal corporation failed to object 
to urban development at time zoning deter-
mination was made and, thus, was preclud-
ed from challenging issuance of conditional 
use permit under development U.C.A. 
1953, 10-1-104, 10-1-104(11), 10-2-414, 10-
2-418. 
Walter R. Miller, Sandy, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Kirton, McConkie 
& Bushnell, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and appellees Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot 
and Postero-Blecker, Inc. 
Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellee Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. 
Kent S. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellee Salt Lake County. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial 
court's dismissal of its action against de-
fendants Salt Lake County, property own-
ers Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot, and 
developers Postero-Blecker, Inc. (Postero-
Blecker) and Chevron USA, Inc. (Chevron). 
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Sandy City's action. 
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of 
commercial property located on the north-
west corner of 10600 South and 1300 East 
in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The 
property abuts Sandy City's boundaries 
and is located within an unincorporated "is-
land" within Sandy City's limits. Since 
1976, the county master plan and Sandy 
City plans have called for rural residential 
uses of the property. 
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In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general 
annexation policy declaration which, among 
other things, delineated twenty-one unin-
corporated islands within the city bound-
aries which Sandy City was willing to an-
nex, including the present parcel. Accord-
ing to Sandy City, this policy declaration 
requires property owners to first attempt 
to annex to Sandy City, thereby obviating 
the County's approval for development of 
commercial property when the development 
cost is in excess of $750,000. 
On August 5, 1987, at the property own-
ers' request, the Salt Lake County Commis-
sion, without amending its master plan, 
adopted a zoning ordinance which permit-
ted commercial development on the present 
property. Sandy City objected to the re-
zoning but failed to appeal the decision.1 
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, 
the agent for the property owners and 
Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a 
conditional use permit to build a Chevron 
service station, car wash, and mini-conve-
nience store on .7 acres of the property. 
This application indicated that the estimat-
ed value of the project was $250,000. The 
property owners also intended to build a 
McDonald's restaurant on the property. 
On September 30, 1987, they filed another 
conditional use permit application which 
valued the McDonald's project at approxi-
mately $300,000. The property owners did 
not petition to annex the property to Sandy 
City. 
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City pro-
tested the Chevron application, indicating 
that "Sandy City is currently considering 
annexation of the property and the annexa-
tion will require an independent considera-
tion of proper zoning for this property." It 
also unsuccessfully petitioned the Salt 
Lake County Commission to reconsider and 
amend its previously passed zoning ordi-
nance. 
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake Coun-
ty Planning Commission approved the 
Chevron conditional use application. On 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1987), an 
appeal from a zoning decision must be made 
within the time and according to the procedure 
specified by the board of county commissioners. 
October 14, 1987, Sandy City appealed this 
decision. The Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission, following several public hear-
ings, denied Sandy City's appeal and en-
tered findings of fact. 
Sandy City then appealed the conditional 
use decision to the Salt Lake County Com-
mission, which held a hearing on December 
9,1987. The Salt Lake County Commission 
affirmed the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission's grant of the Chevron condi-
tional use permit, finding that the required 
statutory procedure had been followed and 
that the grant of the conditional use permit 
was in the community's interest. Sandy 
City then brought this action in the district 
court. 
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake County 
filed with the district court the affidavit of 
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Planning 
Commission's administrative assistant, and 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plan-
ning Commission's September 22 and Octo-
ber 13, 1987 meetings, at which Chevron's 
conditional use permit application had been 
discussed and interested parties had 
presented evidence. Subsequently, Sandy 
City submitted an affidavit indicating that 
the projected cost of the Chevron develop-
ment was between $660,000 to $760,000, 
and that the cost of the McDonald's devel-
opment would be between $900,000 and 
$1,100,000. Simultaneously, Salt Lake 
County submitted the minutes of the April 
28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission, which involved dis-
cussion of the zoning change, along with 
Helen Christiansen's authenticating affida-
vit. All parties moved for summary judg-
ment. 
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt 
Lake County's affidavits, alleging that they 
failed to conform to the requirements of 
rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Chevron responded by filing an affi-
davit indicating that the building value of 
the proposed Chevron station was $175,000. 
While these regulations are not a part of this 
record, there is no dispute that Sandy City failed 
to appeal the rezoning pursuant to these regula-
tions. 
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On February 4, 1988, the day before the 
hearing on Salt Lake County's motion for 
summary judgment, Sandy City's attorney 
moved /or additional discovery time pursu-
ant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. I 
During the hearing on February 5, 1988, 
Salt Lake County requested permission to 
introduce into evidence the certified record 
of the administrative hearings. These 
records included the previously submitted 
commission minutes, with additional maps 
and supporting materials. Sandy City's 
counsel objected, stating that he did not 
know what the administrative record con-
tained and, thus, the record was prejudicial. 
The district court overruled Sandy City's 
objection and allowed the record to be en-
Wed into evidence. On February 19, 1988, 
Salt Lake County submitted the minutes of 
the December 9, 1987 meeting of the Salt 
Lake County Commission,. containing the 
appeal of the conditional use permit grant, 
along with the administrative assistant's 
supporting affidavit. 
Salt Lake County filed the complete cer-
tified administrative record with the dis-
trict court on March 3, 1988. On March 15, 
1988, the district court entered its decision, 
finding that the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission had properly issued the condi-
tional use permit, and that defendants' ac-
tions did not violate the annexation statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986). It 
granted summary judgment in favor of de-
fendants and dismissed Sandy City's action. 
Subsequently, Sandy City unsuccessfully 
moved for an injunction on the develop-
ment of the property during the pendency 
of the appeal. It then brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Sandy City challenges the 
summary judgment, first arguing that 
there were substantial issues of material 
fact making summary judgment improper 
because: tl) Salt Lake County untimely 
submitted the administrative record in vio-
lation of rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; (2) Salt Lake County's adminis-
trative record and affidavits were untimely 
• Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes 
and characterizes some of the issues as annexa-
tion-related, however this appeal is from the 
filed in violation of rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) the affidavits 
and other evidence presented by Chevron 
violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate evi-
dentiary foundation; (4) the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule 
56(f) motion for further discovery; and (5) 
there were substantial issues of material 
fact in the record. Sandy City's second 
major assignment of error is that the trial 
court erroneously interpreted Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-2-418 and 10-1-104(11) (1986) 
by ruling that (1) to preclude urban devel-
opment of the property at issue, Sandy City 
had to formally declare its intention to an-
nex it prior to the occurrence of the events 
leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the Chevron 
development, and possibly the McDonald's 
development, did not constitute "urban de-
velopment" under section 10-1-104(11). 
I. FACTUAL AND 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Before we address Sandy City's conten-
tions, however, it is necessary to examine 
the scope of our review in cases dealing 
with summary judgment and municipal 
zoning issues.2 
[1] In reviewing a summary judgment, 
an appellate court "considers] the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and affirmfs] only where it appears 
there is no genuine dispute as to any mate-
rial issues of fact, or where, even according 
to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." Briggs v. Hoi-
comb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
[2,3] It is well established in Utah that 
"courts of law cannot substitute their judg-
ment 'n ^ p a r p a n"f ?nnincr roonilatinnc fnr 
tha< 
bod 
16 — , — , - . , . „ _ , 
(footnote omitted). Instead, the courts af-
ford a comparatively wide latitude of dis-
grant of a 
function. 
conditional use permit, a zoning 
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cretion to administrative bodies charged 
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as 
endowing their actions with a presumption 
of correctness and validity, because of the 
complexity of factors involved in the mat-
ter of zoning and the specialized knowledge 
of the administrative body. Cottonwood 
Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, the courts will not consider the 
wisdom, necessity, or advisability or other-
wise interfere with a zoning determination 
unless "it is shown that there is no reason-
able basis to justify the action taken." Id. 
[4] In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-15 (1986) indicates that an aggriev-
ed party may "maintain a plenary action 
for relief from any decision of the munici-
pal body within thirty days of the filing of 
the decision. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]he statutory language 'ple-
nary action for relief therefrom ' presup-
poses the continued existence of the admin-
istrative action, thus suggesting an appeal 
rather than a trial de novo." Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 
(Utah 1984). However, "[t]he nature and 
extent of the review depends on what hap-
pened below as reflected by a true record 
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of 
accepted due process requirements." Den-
ver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Central 
Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah 
2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). The su-
preme court also found, in Xanthos, that 
where a hearing has proceeded in accord-
ance with due process requirements, the 
reviewing court can look only to the record, 
which consists of the hearing minutes 
along with the formal findings and order. 
Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. However, 
where no record is preserved, and there is, 
consequently, nothing to review, the re-
viewing court may take evidence. Id. 
While this evidence is not necessarily limit-
ed to the evidence presented below, the 
reviewing court may not retry the case on 
the merits or substitute its judgment for 
that of the municipal body. Id. 
Because an administrative record has 
been preserved in the present circum-
stance, we find that this matter should be 
reviewed on the record, and that a de novo 
trial is inappropriate. 
Under these standards of review, we now 
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial 
court improperly granted summary judg-
ment on evidentiary issues. 
A. Admission of Administrative 
Record 
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake 
County untimely submitted the administra-
tive record in violation of rule 6(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues 
that rule 6(d) requires supporting affidavits 
to be submitted at the time a party files a 
motion for summary judgment, and that 
the administrative record is analogous to a 
supporting affidavit. Because the County 
submitted the administrative record during 
the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, rather than beforehand, and, 
consequently, failed to give Sandy City no-
tice of the contents of the record, Sandy 
City concludes that the trial court should 
not have considered the evidence contained 
in this record in arriving at its summary 
judgment. On the other hand, the County 
argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not set forth any specific procedure for 
certifying an administrative record from a 
county commission to the district court, so 
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it 
deals only with the filing of affidavits. 
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states: 
When a motion is supported by an affida-
vit, the affidavit shall be served with the 
motion; and, except as otherwise provid-
ed in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may 
be served not later than 1 day before the 
hearing, unless the court permits them to 
be served at some other time. 
[5] Prior to the hearing before the dis-
trict court on February 5,1988, the County 
submitted the minutes of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission hearings held 
on April 28, May 12, September 22, October 
13, and October 27, 1987, along with au-
thenticating affidavits. These minutes con-
tained testimony on all of the disputed is-
sues. The record which the County moved 
to be placed into evidence during the dis-
trict court hearing contained these minutes, 
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accompanied by some documentation and a 
large quantity of plat maps, but did not add 
materially to the relevant information al-
ready before the court. The court admit-
ted this record into evidence over the stren-
uous objections of Sandy City, stating that 
"everything down there is not essential to 
a determination of these motions. And I 
think that quite apart from this, [even] if 
the court disregarded this, it will have be-
fore it sufficient undisputed facts of law to 
make decisions in the matter." Subse-
quently, the court admitted into evidence, 
as part of the record, the minutes of the 
Salt Lake County Commission hearing held 
on December 9, 1987, which had not previ-
ously been available, and various doc-
uments that were specifically requested by 
Sandy City's attorney. 
Our review of the record, including the 
administrative record submitted to the 
court, indicates that if there was any error 
in admitting the administrative record, it 
was harmless because it was essentially 
cumulative with respect to the evidence 
already before the court. Further, some of 
the subsequently admitted evidence was 
admitted at Sandy City's request. 
[6] However, we find that the trial 
court did not err in admitting the adminis-
trative record at the time of trial. If we 
follow rule 6(d) literally, styling the admin-
istrative record as the equivalent of an 
affidavit in support of a motion for summa-
ry judgment, the documents must be 
served not later than one day before the 
hearing unless the court permits them to 
be served at some other time. The court, 
therefore, has discretion to admit such doc-
uments at other times, including during the 
hearing. In this case, the court admitted 
documents during and after the hearing, in 
response to requests made by both parties. 
However, there are limitations to this 
discretion. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court has found that the notice provisions 
of rule 6(d) are not hard and fast, it has 
stated that a trial court may dispense with 
technical compliance to them only if there 
is satisfactory proof that a party had "actu-
al notice and time to prepare to meet the 
questions raised by the motion of an adver-
sary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 
519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnote omitted); 
see also Western States Thrift & Loan Co. 
v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019, 
1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 
269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962). 
Although Sandy City objected to the ad-
mission of the administrative record on the 
ground that it did not know what it con-
tained and, therefore, was unprepared to 
argue against it, the trial court properly 
denied this objection because the entire 
record was a matter of public record, had 
been on file for a substantial period of time 
prior to the hearing, and both parties had 
access to it. Further, significant portions 
of the record, in the form of the commis-
sion minutes, were already before the court 
and Sandy City had ample opportunity to 
become familiar with them. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. 
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation 
Sandy City's next claim of error is that 
the affidavits and other evidence presented 
by Chevron and the other defendants vio-
late rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because they lacked an adequate 
evidentiary foundation. 
[7] The relevant portion of rule 56(e) 
states that "[supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal knowl-
edge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." In-
admissible evidence cannot be considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 
421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments i\ 
State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah Ct.App.1989); so an affidavit which 
does not meet the requirements of rule 
56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. How-
ick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 
498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blom-
quist, 504 P.2d at 1020-21 (an affidavit 
containing statements made only "on infor-
mation and belief" is insufficient and will 
be disregarded). 
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Sandy City moved to strike defendants' 
affidavits for their failure to conform to 
these requirements. In its motion to 
strike, Sandy City attacked defendant 
Chevron's memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment and the affi-
davit of Helen J. Christiansen, along with 
its attached exhibits, to the extent that 
they were used to establish the allegations 
set forth in Chevron's memorandum. 
[8] Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits 
served to establish that she was the custo-
dian of the record before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission and that, on 
the basis of her personal knowledge, the 
hearing minutes and a copy of McDonald's 
Corporation's application for a conditional 
use permit were the correct records of the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission. 
Under rules 902(4) and 1005 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, public records are ad-
missible as an exception to the general rule 
excluding hearsay evidence if they are 
"certified as correct by the custodian." 
Utah R.Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Chris-
tiansen's affidavit conformed to rule 56(e) 
with regard to the admission of the exhibits 
as portions of the administrative record 
before the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
mission. As such, they are admissible evi-
dence and are not subject to a motion to 
strike. 
Sandy City challenges various state-
ments made in these minutes as being with-
out evidentiary foundation. These allega-
tions, however, go to the merits of grant-
ing the conditional use permit and not to 
any procedural defects. Therefore, we are 
not concerned with them under our stan-
dard of review. Consequently, we find 
Sandy City's objections to the foundation of 
statements made in the record to be with-
out merit. 
C. Further Discovery 
[9] Sandy City argues that the district 
court erred in refusing to permit it to con-
duct further discovery pursuant to rule 
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 56(f) provides that a court may contin-
ue a motion for summary judgment to per-
mit the moving party to obtain affidavits or 
take depositions. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 
414, 416 (Utah 1990). Rule 56(f) reads as 
follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depo-
sitions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
It is generally held that rule 56(f) mo-
tions should be granted liberally to provide 
adequate opportunity for discovery, Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 
838, 841 (Utah Ct.App.1987) because infor-
mation gained during discover}' may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Dovm-
town Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275, 278 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, 
courts are unwilling to "spare the litigants 
from their own lack of diligence," Cal-
lioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. 
Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1984)), 
so do not grant rule 56(f) motions when 
dilatory or lacking in merit. Reeves v. Gei-
gy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Downtown Athletic 
Club, 740 P.2d at 278-79. 
[10] A rule 56(f) movant must file an 
affidavit to preserve his or her contention 
that summary judgment should be delayed 
pending further discovery. Callioux, 745 
P.2d at 841. In this affidavit, the movant 
must explain how the requested continu-
ance will aid his or her opposition to sum-
mary judgment. Id. The trial court has 
discretion to determine whether the rea-
sons stated in a rule 56(f) affidavit are 
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. 
[11] Sandy City filed an affidavit with 
the court along with its rule 56(f) motion, 
stating that it had been unable to take 
defendants' depositions or to obtain a certi-
fied copy of certain county commission 
minutes. It indicated that it wanted to 
pursue additional discovery which would 
show that: (1) the proposed use of the 
SANDY CITY v. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Cite as 794 P.2d 482 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Utah 489 
property contradicted the county master 
plan and that insufficient evidence had 
been presented to the County Planning 
Commission to demonstrate conformity 
with the plan; (2) the proposed zoning 
would not contribute to the general well-be-
ing of the neighborhood; (3) the proposed 
use would be detrimental to the health, 
safety, and general welfare of persons re-
siding in the vicinity; (4) the true scope, 
costs, and impact of the development was 
not accurately and fully communicated to 
the county officials during the decision-
making process; and (5) the costs of the 
development would substantially exceed 
$750,000. 
To determine whether this affidavit was 
sufficient to merit a rule 56(f) continuance, 
several factors must have been considered: 
(1) Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the 
party against whom summary judgment 
is sought merely on a "fishing expedi-
tion" for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discover}' has been conducted 
without producing any significant evi-
dence? (2) Was there sufficient time 
since the inception of the lawsuit for the 
party against whom the summary judg-
ment is sought to use discovery proce-
dures, and thereby cross-examine the 
moving party? (3) If discovery proce-
dures were timely initiated, was the non-
moving party afforded an appropriate re-
sponse? 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 
764 P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 
740 P.2d at 278. 
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings 
state, in part: 
1. The estimated cost of the development is 
approximately SI75,000.... 
2. This development is consistent with the 
intent of the Salt Lake County Master Plan by 
placing commercial development at major in-
tersections within the county. The Little Cot-
tonwood District Plan was generally intended 
to be applicable through 1985 and the map is 
now outdated in this immediate area. Since 
the adoption of the plan in 1976, Sandy City 
rezoned the northeast corner of 10600 South 
1300 East to commercial, which changed the 
character of the intersection. Additional 
commercial development is now appropriate 
at this intersection and is consistent with the 
existing development approved by Sandy City. 
In determining if Sandy City's request 
for further discovery was meritorious, we 
first consider the relevant standard of re-
view. As we noted above, in municipal 
zoning decisions, the couris do not consider 
the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of 
particular actions. See Sandy City v. City 
of South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 
(Utah 1982). Instead, the reviewing court 
may consider whether the municipality act-
ed in conformance with its enabling stat-
utes and ordinances pursuant to its compre-
hensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 
(1965). The court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the municipality on 
the merits of these issues, however. Id. at 
129. 
The trial record contained evidence as to 
Salt Lake County's enabling statutes, ordi-
nances, and plans. It also indicated that 
the Salt Lake County Commission con-
sidered evidence with respect to all the 
issues on which Sandy City wished to per-
form additional discovery. The Salt Lake 
County Commission made findings of fact 
going to the merits of these issues.3 Dis-
covery relating to the merits of the issues 
was improper under the standard of re-
view, but could properly be held with re-
spect to enabling statutes and procedural 
issues. However, there was already sub-
stantial evidence on the record regarding 
the relevant enabling statutes and plans. 
Further, Sandy City did not allege in its 
affidavit that it needed additional time to 
discover procedural errors committed by 
3. The development will provide additional 
gasoline services which are needed and desir-
able in the neighborhood and community 
4. The development is buffered from adja-
cent residential uses by property zoned R-M 
and will not be detrimental to the health, 
safety or general welfare of persons residing 
or working in the vicinity or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity. 
The traffic engineer has reviewed and ap-
proved the application. Upon compliance 
with the conditions required by the Planning 
Commission, the development will be an at-
tractive addition to the community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with the 
regulation and conditions of the Zoning Ordi-
nance. 
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Salt Lake County in granting the condition-
al building permit. Therefore, we find that 
the trial court could reasonably conclude 
that the reasons Sandy City articulated in 
its affidavit would produce only cumulative 
evidence and, so, were inadequate to merit 
a continuance under rule 56(f). 
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time 
and opportunity during the pendency of the 
action before the county commissions to 
develop and present evidence in its favor 
and to determine and refute the defen-
dants' evidence. The record indicates that 
on August 5, 1987, the Salt Lake County 
Commission adopted the zoning ordinance 
allowing commercial development on the 
property at issue, following hearings on the 
issue held in April and May of 1987. Sandy 
City objected to the rezoning at this time 
but failed to appeal. On August 26, 1987, 
Postero-Blecker applied for the Chevron 
conditional use permit. Sandy City protest-
ed the application on September 18, 1987, 
and subsequently was involved in several 
public hearings on the issue before both 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
and the Salt Lake County Commission, at 
which it had ample opportunity to present 
evidence. Sandy City appealed to the dis-
trict court in December 1987. The hearing 
on the summary judgment motion was fi-
nally held on February 5, 1988, nearly a 
year after the initial zoning hearings had 
taken place. As stated previously, the 
court will not use a rule 56(f) motion to 
shield the movant from his or her lack of 
diligence. 
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion, 
[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowl-
edge or control of the facts by the mov-
ing party is not adequate: the opposing 
party must show to the best of his ability 
what facts are within the movant's exclu-
sive knowledge or control; what steps 
have been taken to obtain the desired 
information pursuant to discovery proce-
dures under the Rules; and that he is 
desirous of taking advantage of these 
discovery procedures. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's 
' Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)). 
Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with 
these requirements. Therefore, we con-
clude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule 
56(f) motion. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Sandy City argues that the court failed 
to consider evidence which created the fol-
lowing genuine issues of material fact: (1) 
Sandy City's willingness to annex, as 
shown by its express declaration in its an-
nexation policy declaration and its attor-
ney's statements before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission; (2) that the 
projected cost of the Chevron project ex-
ceeded 5750,000, as shown by a certified 
appraisal setting the cost as between $660,-
000 and $760,000; (3) that the Chevron 
station was only part of a larger scheme to 
develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in that the 
Chevron station would take only xh of the 
parcel, the property owners' represented 
that the property would be a "commercial 
subdivision." and that they would be the 
sole developers of the entire tract; (4) that 
the cost for the entire development, exclud-
ing the cost of the land, would exceed 
$750,000; and (5) the development was not 
in compliance with the county master plan 
and county ordinances which called for ru-
ral use of the subject property, and would 
create traffic hazards and planning prob-
lems. *N 
[12] Many of these issues are actually 
issues of law. The only issues of fact are 
the projected cost of the project and wheth-
er the proposed development was in compli-
ance with the county master plan and coun-
ty ordinances. As we have noted above, 
these issues were discussed and evidence 
was presented before the county commis-
sions, which entered written findings and 
decided them on their merits. Because 
their findings were supported by evidence, 
we do not disturb them on review. See 
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 
P.2d 883, 885-86 (Utah CtApp.1989) (ad-
ministrative agency's factual findings will 
not be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary 
and capricious"). 
II. LEGAL ISSUES 
We next address Sandy City's contention 
that the trial court erred in its interpreta-
tion and application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-418 (1986) and § 10-1-104(11) 
(1986). Because summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law rather than 
fact, the appellate court is free to reap-
praise the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 498 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam); Parents Against 
Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Home-
owner's Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah Ct. 
App.1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 
34, 35 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
A Annexation Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 prohibits ur-
ban development "within one-half mile of a 
municipality in the unincorporated territory 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declara-
tion, if a municipality is willing to annex 
the territory proposed for such develop-
ment under the standards and require-
ments set forth in this chapter." (Empha-
sis added.) The parties disagree as to 
whether Sandy City, to prevent urban de-
velopment in the disputed territory, was 
required under this statute to formally de-
clare its intention to annex the territory 
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 (1986) re-
quires a municipality, prior to annexing 
unincorporated territory of more than five 
acres, to adopt a policy declaration indicat-
ing the standard under which it is willing 
to annex the territory. Sandy City argues 
that it expressly declared its willingness to 
annex the property before initiation of the 
present lawsuit by (1) promulgating a gen-
eral policy declaration indicating its willing-
ness to annex the property, if petitioned, 
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its 
counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission that it was 
willing to annex the property. The trial 
court found that Sandy City was obliged to 
4
« We note that the property at issue consists of 
4
-18 acres while section *10-2-418 applies to 
Parcels consisting of at least five acres. There-
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make a formal declaration of intent to an-
nex, in addition to its general policy decla-
ration, to invoke the protection of section 
10-2-414. 
[13] Even though Sandy City, in its 
master policy declaration, had indicated its 
interest in annexing the property should 
the property owners so petition, the proper-
ty owners never petitioned, nor did Sandy 
City attempt to annex the property on its 
own. Further, it did not appeal the coun-
ty's initial zoning decision pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-9 (1986), and raise this 
issue at that time. Instead, it waited to 
raise the issue on the subsequent grant of 
the conditional use permit, where the rele-
vant issues do not include the proposed use 
of the land or any annexation issue, but 
only whether the proposed use comports 
with the previously enacted zoning regula-
tions and county master plan. Because 
Sandy City could and should have raised 
this issue earlier, we find that it is preclud-
ed from raising it now. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). As such, we do not 
address the issue of whether Sandy City 
was required under section 10-2-418, in 
addition to its master policy declaration, to 
officially declare its willingness to annex a 
territory of less than five acres.4 Conse-
quently, we find Sandy City's objection to 
be without merit 
We affirm the trial court's finding 
against Sandy City on this issue, even 
though we assign a totally different ratio-
nale than that used by the trial court. See, 
e.g., Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 716 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). 
B. Urban Development 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) states 
that "[ujrban development shall not be ap-
proved or permitted within one-half mile of 
a municipality in the unincorporated area 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declara-
tion.'* "Urban development" is defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(11) (1986) as 
fore, section 10-2-418 would be inapplicable in 
the present case. 
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"a housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an average of less 
than one acre per residential unit or a 
commercial or industrial development for 
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for 
any or all phases." 
Pursuant to its objective of preventing 
the proposed development of the disputed 
territory, Sandy City argues that the trial 
court erred in finding the value of the 
proposed development did not exceed $750,-
000 because (1) the definition of "urban 
development" under section 10-1-104 in-
cludes not only the value of the building 
itself, but also the cost of the land and the 
value of the building fixtures; and (2) the 
$750,000 figure encompasses all commer-
cial ventures to be built on the disputed 
territory. Salt Lake County, on the other 
hand, alleges that the only relevant cost 
under the definition is that of the building 
alone and does not include the land and 
building fixtures, and that the $750,000 fig-
ure applies to each individual development 
venture separately initiated on the proper-
ty. 
[14] Again, because Sandy City has not 
made any attempt to annex the territory 
and should have raised its objections to 
urban development at the time of the zon-
ing determination rather than at the subse-
quent granting of a conditional use permit, 
we decline to interpret this statute. Be-
cause the interpretation of section 10-2-
414 would have no relevance to the proprie-
ty of the county's grant of a conditional 
use permit under our standard of review, 
any interpretation we would make would 
be an advisory opinion, which we decline to 
issue under well established standards of 
judicial review. See Ringwood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (where the result in the 
prior action constitutes the full relief avail-
able to the parties on the same claim, or 
where the issue could and should have been 
litigated in the prior action, the claim is 
precluded under the doctrine of res judica-
ta); Reynolds u Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 
1045 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (there is a long-
standing judicial policy in Utah to avoid 
advisory opinions). Therefore, we find this 
issue to be without merit. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
BENCH, J., concurs in the result. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
John W. JARMAN and Helene B. 
Jarman, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
CO., Defendant and Appellant 
No. 890106-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 11, 1990. 
Lessors brought action against out-
door advertising sign company seeking re-
moval of signs that company had relocated 
at request of state, which had acquired 
right-of-way from lessors. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Summit County, Michael R. 
Murphy, J., entered judgment in favor of 
lessors, and sign company appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1) 
lease was ambiguous and, therefore, parok, 
evidence was admissible to determine par-
ties' intent, and (2) evidence supported de-
termination that parties intended to contin-
ue sign company's right to maintain signs 
only in their existing locations. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>842(8) 
Whether ambiguity exists in contract 
is question of law reviewed for correctness. 
2. Evidence <s»450(4) 
Lease agreement relating to placement 
of two outdoor advertising signs on proper-
ty was ambiguous in relation to location of 
signs, and thus parol evidence could be 
accepted in determining intent of parties, 
17-27-5. General purposes in making master 
plan. 
In the preparation of a county master plan, a 
county planning commission shall make careful and 
comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing 
conditions and probable future growth of the territory 
within its jurisdiction. The county master plan shall 
be made with the general purpose of guiding and ac-
complishing a co-ordinated, adjusted, and harmoni-
ous development of the county which will, in accor-
dance with present and future needs and resources, 
best promote the health, safety, morals, order, conve-
nience, prosperity, or the general welfare of the in-
habitants, as well as efficiency and economy in the 
process of development, including, amongst other 
things, such distribution of population and of the uses 
of land for urbanization, trade, industry, habitation, 
recreation, agriculture, arboretum and other pur-
poses, as will tend to create conditions favorable to 
health, safety, energy conservation, transportation, 
prosperity, civic activities, and recreational, educa-
tional and cultural opportunities; will tend to reduce 
the wastes of physical, financial, or human resources 
which result from either excessive congestion or ex-
cessive scattering of population; and will tend toward 
an efficient and economical utilization, conservation 
and production of the supply of food and water, and of 
drainage, sanitary, and other facilities and resources. 
1961 
17-27-13. Purpose of regulations. 
Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, 
convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the 
present and future inhabitants of the state of Utah, 
including, amongst other things, the lessening of con-
gestion in the streets or roads or reducing the waste 
of excessive amounts of roads, promoting energy con-
servation and greater utilization of solar and other 
renewable energy sources, securing safety from fire 
and other dangers, providing adequate light and air, 
classification of land uses and distribution of land 
development and utilization, protection of the tax 
base, securing economy in governmental expendi-
tures, fostering the state's agricultural and other in-
dustries, and the protection of both urban and nonur-
ban development. issi 
17-27-11. Zoning districts — Regulation 
From and after the time when the county p 
commission of any county, in accordance v 
procedure hereinabove specified, makes, adc 
certifies to the board of county commissioner 
or plans for zoning the unincorporated t 
within any county, or any part thereof, in 
both the full text of a zoning resolution and th 
and after public hearing thereon, then the I: 
commissioners, may by resolution regulate 
portion or portions of such county which lie ou 
cities and towns, the location, height, bulk ant 
buildings and other structures, the percentag 
which may be occupied, the size of yards, cou 
other open spaces, the uses of buildings anc 
tures for trade, industry, residence, recreation 
activities or other purposes, access to sunlight 
ergy devices, and the uses of land for trade, in 
residence, recreation or other purposes. In o 
accomplish such regulation, the board of count 
missioners may divide the territory of the 
which lies outside of cities and towns into d 
and zones of such number, shape or area as 
determine, and within such districts may re 
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alt* 
and uses of buildings and structures, and the 
land, and may require and provide for the issui 
building permits as a condition precedent to th 
to erect, construct, reconstruct or alter any bi 
or structure within any zone covered by such 
resolution; provided* however, no permit shall 1 
essary where the erection, construction, recor 
tion or alteration of any building or struct 
minor in character and will not substantial!) 
the location, height, bulk or size of the build 
other structure or the percentage of lot to be occ 
The county planning commission may make ar 
tify a single plan for the entire unincorporate 
tion of the county, or separate and successive 
for those parts which it deems to be urbanized oi 
able for urban development and those parts whi 
reason of distance from existing urban commu 
or for other causes, it deems suitable for non 
development; and any resolution adopted b; 
board of county commissioners may cover and in 
the unincorporated territory covered and incluc 
any such single plan or in any such separate 
successive plans. No resolution covering more o 
than the territory covered by any such certified 
mall, however, be adopted or put into effect unti 
oniess it be first submitted to the county p\ai 
commission which had certified the plan to the i 
of county commissioners and be approved by 
commission or, if disapproved, receive the favo 
vote of not less than a majority of the entire mer 
ship of such board. Ail such regulations shall be 
form for each class or kind of buiiding or stru< 
throughout any zone, but the regulations in am 
zone may differ from those in other zones. Zo 
unless county-wide, shall be limited to districts e 
lished by the board of county commissioners, e 
on petition as hereinbefore (hereinafter) providi 
by direct action as hereinbefore provided. 
17-27*102, Purpose. 
to accomplish the purpose of chis ace, and in order co provide for 
Che heal eh, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve che 
morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of che 
county and its present and future inhabitants and businesses, co protect 
the cax base, secure economy in governmental expenditures, foster che 
state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and 
nonurban development, and co orocecc property values, counties may enact 
all ordinances, resolucions, and rules chat chey consider necessary for 
che use and development of land within che county, including ordinances, 
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces, structures, 
buildings, energy-efficiency, light and air, transportation, 
infrastructure, public facilities, vegetation, and crees and landscaping, 
unless chose ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited 
17-27-301. General plan. 
(1) In order co accomplish che purposes sec forth in chis chancer, 
each county shall prepare and adopt a comprehensive general plan for; 
(a) che present and future needs of che county; and 
(b) che growth and development of che land within che county or any 
part of che councy, including uses of land for urbanization, trade, 
industry, residential, agricultural, and other purposes. 
(2) The plan may provide for: 
(a) healch, general welfare, safety, energy conservation, 
transportation, prospericy, civic accivities, and recreational, 
educational, and cultural opportunities; 
(b) che reduccion of che wasce of physical, financial, or human 
resources chac result from eicher excessive congestion or excessive 
scactering of population; 
(c) the efficient and economical use, conservation, and production 
of che supply of food and water, and of drainage, sanitary, and other 
facilities and resources; 
(d) the use of energy conservation and solar and renewable energy 
resources; and 
(e) the protection of urban development. 
(3) The county may determine the comprehensiveness, extent, and 
Adc 
BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
In the Matter of a Conditional « 
Use Application for a 
Chevron Service Station 
located at 10600 South : 
1300 East 
: FINDINGS 
: PL-87-2177 
The Salt Lake County Planning Commission granted 
preliminary approval on September 22, 1987, of the captioned 
conditional use application based upon the following findings: 
1. The estimated cost of the development is approxi-
mately $175,000, which excludes the development from the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated 10-2-418. Land costs need 
not be included in determination of cost. 
2. This development is consistent with the intent of 
the Salt Lake County Master Plan by placing commercial 
development at major intersections within the county. The 
Little Cottonwood District Plan was generally intended to be 
applicable through 1985 and the map is now outdated in this 
immediate area. Since the adoption of the plan in 1976, Sandy 
City rezoned the northeast corner of 10600 South 1300 East to 
commercial, which changed the character of the intersection. 
Additional commercial development is now appropriate at this 
intersection and is consistent with the existing commercial 
development approved by Sandy City. 
oo 
3. The development will provide additional gasoline 
fices which are needed and desirable in the neighborhood and 
nunity. Several residents stated the development would 
vide additional services to the area. The White City 
munity Council recommended approval of the development. 
4. The development is buffered from adjacent 
idential uses by property zoned R-M and will not be 
rimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
liding or working in the vicinity or injurious to property or 
movements in the vicinity. The traffic engineer has 
viewed and approved the application. Upon compliance with 
» conditions required by the Planning Commission, the 
/elopment will be an attractive addition to the community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with the regulation and 
nditions of the Zoning Ordinance. 
DATED this day of November, 1987. 
SALT LAKE PLANNING COMMISSION 
B y . 
lairman 
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